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**1975/10/00**

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Authority: NND979520

By OP

NARA Date 12/2/97

SECRETCheck List For Meeting with the Foreign Minister at 4:30 p.m.


We believe there are two basic objectives in your meeting: (1) to explore the Chinese attitude on any public document to be issued at the end of the trip and, (2) to see whether the Chinese are willing to take cooperative actions in the face of Soviet expansionism.

Public Document

As already indicated, we believe that you should follow your original plan of appearing relaxed on this issue. You should state matter of factly that our exchanges in recent weeks have made it clear that we have different perspectives on how our relationship should be publicly portrayed, i.e. their emphasis on our differences and our belief that it is in the mutual interest to show a more vital, cooperative relationship. You should indicate that we are relaxed about this question, and in fact can live without any communique or press statement at all. We would be interested in hearing whether they have any further views on this subject.

It is conceivable after the clearing of the air in recent weeks and a strong possibility that they had an extensive internal debate over their future course, they might be more amenable to some kind of meaningful document. This remains unlikely, however, and in any event if they wish to change course, they will not be shy about letting us know. So there is no reason to appear eager. On balance, it is probably premature to table our bland press statement at this point. If they have no suggestions, you could merely say that we can leave this issue open for another day or so while the talks go on. On the other hand, if it is clear that no communique at all is the most likely or preferred outcome, you should probably pin this down now so that we can begin preparing the press for this outcome.

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Cooperative Actions.


On this subject you should pick up on the theme that the President sounded at the end of this morning's session about our interest in what they are willing to do in terms of actions to counter expansionism. You can continue the effort to get ourselves off the defensive and shift the burden of the argument to the Chinese and foreshadow tomorrow morning's discussion. As a minimum this serves to underline the point that we are taking actions while they confine themselves generally to rhetoric. In addition, we might be able to identify some areas where cooperation is possible, at least of a tacit nature. It is, in any event, important to begin driving home to them that they cannot expect us to do all the resisting while they not only do not assist us but even in some instances undercut us. Finally, they must understand that if they want/expect us to help them in a crisis, it is essential to have laid the psychological and political groundwork with our domestic opinion by having demonstrated some vitality in our dealings with Peking, both on international questions and bilaterally. If we wait until a crisis to act together, not only will we be in an inferior strategic position but we may not have the necessary public backing.

Following are some examples of areas for cooperative actions:

-- In some cases we can take concrete actions in parallel for a common objective. Angola is a current example. They could continue to supply arms, if not advisers. They could press Tanzania to release their shipments and stop favoring the Soviets. They could appeal to the OAU, as we have, to press for a negotiated solution that allows all elements to be represented in a government, etc.

-- In other areas, they could be helpful in promoting the same goal, even if for ideological reasons they must mute any cooperation with us. An example here is Southeast Asia, where we both wish to restrict Hanoi (backed by Moscow). They asked us to talk to the Cambodians and we have done so without any response so far. Thailand has asked us to

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
ask the Chinese to encourage better Thai relations with Cambodia and Laos. You told Chatchai that we shared the Thai strategic goal of promoting independent buffer states in Cambodia and Laos to form a belt around Vietnam. The Chinese can be helpful in this region with their influence in these two countries as well as any thing they can do to moderate Hanoi.

-- There are other areas where the Chinese can at least make sure they do not undermine our efforts, even if they cannot contribute much by themselves. For example, the Foreign Minister's UN speech was very harsh on our step-by-step negotiating efforts in the Middle East, even though Peking should realize that this has served to undermine Soviet influence and that we are in fact aiming toward an overall settlement. Beyond reining in their public criticism, the Chinese could, in addition, work behind the scenes with key states like Egypt and Syria to reinforce our efforts.

-- We recognize that in certain areas the Chinese are in fact being somewhat helpful. For example, we appreciate their telling the Europeans of the need for trans-Atlantic cooperation, European unity, and a strong NATO. On the other hand, it is not helpful for them to suggest to the Europeans that we would pull a "Dunkirk" rather than defending them in the face of a Soviet onslaught. In addition they should not press the concept of a strong European defense effort too much less this suggests that Europe can go it alone (Schmidt's point). In addition, we appreciate Chinese support of strong US-Japanese ties. We note this is one area where the Chinese view has evolved since the early days of your discussions with Chou En-lai when they said that we were fattening the Japanese up to make them militaristic again and also that we should sever our security links. We believe the Chinese now have a healthy recognition of the restraining influence of our close ties with the Japanese.

-- We think there are some areas where it is in our mutual interest not to be drawn into a confrontation by our respective friends, e.g. Korea. We have made a reasonable

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proposal to diffuse this situation, in a forum which at least in the first instance would exclude Moscow.

-- On some issues the Chinese should at least see the contradictions in their positions. For example, while we can perhaps understand Chinese support for OPEC oil prices because of third world ideological reasons, they should also realize that the oil crisis has dealt heavy blows to Europe and Japan, as well as to large parts of the third world itself. Making our allies more vulnerable and less able to maintain strong defenses can hardly be in the interest of the Chinese.

-- Finally, there is the question of showing vitality in our bilateral relations, rather than stagnation or backsliding. There is no need to belabor this point as you covered it at some length during your trip. The basic point here is the need to demonstrate to our people some momentum in the relationship so that they will support closer association with Peking in a crisis if necessary. We have suggested many concrete ideas, for example, in the original draft communique we gave the Chinese during your trip. Another possibility that the Foreign Minister alluded to is oil. We have made our views amply clear to the Chinese. On this subject of bilateral cooperation, we can live without such vitality in our relationship and leave it up to the Chinese, though we do not consider it to be in their interest any more than in ours.